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Abstract 
The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar has drawn international att ention due to gross violations of 
human rights, which have occurred in the confl ict. This condition forces the Rohingya to fl ee 
from confl ict areas in the att empt to seek protection from neighbouring countries including 
Indonesia. To deal with the refugees, the Indonesian government, alongside Muslim organizations, 
have taken immediate steps in tackling the crisis. However, behind the  humanitarian  solidarity 
lays a critical problem related to the religious sentiment toward the Buddhist community in 
Indonesia. The sentiment that tarnished the humanitarian principles and threatened Indonesian 
multiculturalism showed the versatile side of identity. To provide a bett er understanding of 
identity-based confl ict, this article explored how a group’s sense of collectivity can easily turn into 
sentiment. By conducting multiple interviews with the representatives of Muslim Organizations 
and also collecting secondary data related to the Islam conservative agenda, this paper aimed 
to outline the paradox of Indonesian Muslim response toward the Rohingya’s refugees crisis. 
Using Ross’s theories of identity confl ict and using Galtung conception of social confl ict, the 
fi ndings concluded that religious sentiment in Indonesia during the Rohingya’s refugee crisis 
are led by blind fanaticism toward certain religious beliefs that bitt erly trample the nation’s sense 
of solidarity. 
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Introduction 
The humanitarian crisis in Rakhine, 
which involved the Rohingya minority has 
had a signifi cant impact not only on Myanmar 
domestic politics but also on other nations. 
More than 600,000 ethnic Rohingya people 
fled into Bangladesh, which became the 
primary destination for the refugees to seek 
protection (Martin et al., 2017, p. ii). The rest 
of the refugees tried to fi nd a more conducive 
environment in other Asian countries, such 
as Malaysia and Thailand. In 2015, more 
than 2,000 Rohingyan were stranded and 
rescued by the Aceh fi shermen in Indonesia 
(Jati, 2017, p. 18). A large number of refugees 
and the gross violations of human rights 
that caused many Rohingya to lose their 
lives, homes, freedom and dignity, have 
prompted international communities to initiate 
necessary measures in assisting the victims. 
The humanitarian crisis also received coverage 
from international media, which pressured the 
Myanmar government to resolve the confl ict. 
Despite the pressure from the international 
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community, the Myanmar government has 
not shown any positive response to this 
demand (Milton, 2017, p. 3). Association of 
Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) is expected 
to play an active role as mediator. However, 
ASEAN undergo major obstacles in dealing 
with the Rohingya issue in consideration to 
the principle of non-intervention that is still 
fi rmly held by its members (Arendshorst, 2009, 
p. 103). In this stagnant condition, transnational 
communities pave the way for humanitarian 
relief and bridge the gap for humanitarian 
diplomacy with Myanmar. This involvement 
of transnational communities creates a new 
level of att ention to the Rohingya confl ict with 
the widespread of solidarity voiced by Muslim 
societies in various countries (Hidayat, Sari, 
& Pratisti, 2017, p. 404). In Southeast Asia, 
protests against Myanmar repressive policy 
towards Rohingya had been distinctly voiced 
by a number of civil society movements. They 
initiated the Southeast Asia Humanitarian 
Mission (SEAHUM), a committ ee established 
to respond to the Rohingya crisis (Hidayat et 
al., 2017, p. 404).
Despite the international efforts, the 
humanitarian crisis still ongoing in Myanmar 
has led to another wave of refugees in early 
2018 (The Jakarta Post, 2018). Referring to the 
historical complexity,1 confl ict in Myanmar is 
rooted in the country’s struggle over political 
1 Myanmar’s territory divided into seven states named 
according to the majority ethnic population and seven 
regions inhabited by a majority ethnic Burmese. 
Myanmar’s population in 2011 ranged from 48,337 
million. The ethnic composition of the population 
according to the Central Intelligence Agency (2013) is 
Burmese ethnic 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, 
China 3%, Indian 2%, Mon 2%, and others 5%. On the 
other hand, the religious composition of the population 
includes 89% of Buddhists, 4% of Islam, and the rests 
are Christians and other beliefs (Habibollahi, McLean, & 
Diker 2013). Khin (2005) stated that Muslims in Burma 
constitute a signifi cant minority accounting for about 
13% of the Buddhist-dominated country (p. 176). The 
diversity in the Burmese Muslim population has its 
eff ect in their respective dealings with the Buddhist 
majority. Each group has very diff erent relationships 
with the Buddhist majority and with each other.
and economic control between two contending 
groups, the military Junta and the National 
Democratic League. Rakhine, the province 
where the atrocities took place, is a state 
in Myanmar with the highest number of 
Muslims; about 45% of the total Muslims 
in Myanmar (Kyaw, Taylor, & Tin, 2005). 
However, this confl ict has evolved into ethnic 
and religious confl ict since the parties involved 
are categorized based on the religious group 
of the Buddhist majority and the Muslim 
minorities (Raharjo, 2015, p. 35). This brought 
a signifi cant impact to the nature of confl ict by 
shifting it into identity politics. The Rohingya 
case reached the realm of transboundary 
confl ict as it triggered a strong reaction from 
international Muslim communities. Indonesia, 
the largest Muslim country in the world, is also 
aff ected by the confl ict. In Indonesia, Muslim 
communities from international non-state 
organizations to individual movements have 
continued to provide humanitarian assistance 
for the Rohingya. The Muslim communities 
in Indonesia demonstrated great sympathy 
to the Rohingnya since the country has also 
experienced its dark history of identity confl ict 
in Ambon. This sympathy indicates that 
identity is a strong factor to drive solidarity. 
However, sympathy also can trigger social 
confl ict–such a case happened in 2017 when 
humanitarian solidarity for the Rohingya 
was trampled by religious sentiment toward 
Buddhists in Indonesia.
The sentiment hit a critical point in 2017 
when the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela 
Islam, FPI) intended to destroy Borobudur as 
a symbolic action for their resentment toward 
the Myanmar government (BBC, 2017). They 
also accused Buddhists of Indonesia of being 
involved in supporting violence towards 
the Rohingya (Hodges & Rayda, 2017). This 
phenomenon sets a crucial remark in the outline 
of Indonesian Muslims’ response toward 
the Rohingya refugees crisis. As identity 
cohesiveness worked as a driving force for 
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Indonesian Muslims to assist the Rohingya, the 
act should be based on the principle of humanity 
rather than blind fanaticism. However, the 
religious sentiment has demeaned the Muslim 
solidarity towards the Rohingya and threatened 
the multiculturalism of Indonesia. Therefore, 
this article offers an outline of Indonesian 
Muslim responses toward the Rohingya crises 
by answering two basic questions: What 
drives the massive humanitarian solidarity 
of Indonesian Muslims toward the Rohingya 
refugees? And why is there the other side of 
the coin—a destructive side of identity that has 
tarnished the sincere humanitarian action of the 
Indonesian Muslims? The act of scapegoating a 
specifi c religious is not only contradictory to the 
humanitarian principles but also threatens  the 
unity of Indonesia. And lastly, the article also 
depicts how Indonesian Muslims dealt with 
the sentiment. 
Literature Review
Studies of group identity found their 
basis in “collective sense,” a perception of 
an individual’s sense of belonging to an “in-
group” constructed from the group interaction 
with another (Luhtanen, 1992). In the era of 
globalization, the collective sense is no longer 
bound to the state territory, as dissemination 
and interaction through various transborder 
becomes more visible. It may also function as 
the basis of solidarity that can bring positive 
values such as humanitarianism. Kastoriano 
(2000) mentioned that the idea of a transnational 
society refers to “a community consist of 
individuals or groups formed in different 
national societies, and acting on the basis 
of common interests and references (which 
may be territorial, religious or linguistic), and 
networks used to strengthen their solidarity 
outside boundaries of the state.” But on the 
other hand, the collective sense also bears 
a burden as the source of the most violent 
social confl ict recorded in history, including 
genocide and ethnoreligious confl ict, as the 
others are often perceived as threat (Ross, 
2007). Another basis for identity studies is 
the emphasis on structural approaches to 
analyze the relationships between the groups 
involved (Styker & Burke, 2000). The unequal 
distribution of political and economic resources 
repeatedly turns into the cause of disputes 
among identity groups, which lead to violent 
confl ict. There are several cases related to the 
structural inequalities; for example, the unequal 
distribution of land that led to genocide in 
Darfur, Sudan (Hagan & Rymon-Richmond, 
2009), and the separatist movements in Aceh 
caused by disparities in economic distribution. 
In both cases, the imbalance of inter-group 
relations triggered the perception of threats 
from one group to another.
Intertwined with cultural narratives and 
emotional bonds constructed in society, the 
perception of threats towards other groups 
played the basic formation of identity confl icts 
(Wolff , 2006, p. 38). The emotional dimension 
adds to the complexity and amplifies the 
particular character of identity confl icts. The 
Rohingya crisis bears a similar complexity. It 
evolves from a confl ict of political repression 
and unequal economic distribution into a 
confl ict between identities, which shapes the 
mindset of society, both domestically and 
internationally. Wilson (2008) explains that 
emotional factors are most likely to motivate 
individuals to commit violence in identity 
conflict. While analysts often emphasize 
one of two types of motivation and rational 
calculation of interests (utility maximization 
or instrumentalism), proponents of rational 
choice recognize the role of emotion in confl ict. 
Wilson also stated that it is important to analyze 
confl icts at four distinct levels: individual, sub-
communal, communal, and structural levels, as 
an att empt to understand the agendas, social 
construction, and human interaction which 
constitutes violence.
Galtung (1958) defi nes social confl ict as a 
confl ict involving people or groups, rooted in 
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the lack of common ground or common interest 
between parties. But suggesting identity 
confl ict solely as a matt er of diff erent interest 
simply lightens its intricacy. Therefore, Coser 
(as cited in Zeitlin, 1998) redefi nes the concept 
of social identity conflict as a competition 
resulted from an att empt of diff erent groups 
to gain recognition of certain values and 
status. Thus, interest in identity conflict is 
strongly related to the values and principles 
held by the disputing group. But it does not 
mean Galtung’s ideas of social confl ict lost its 
relevancy, since he provided an understanding 
of the level of confl ict that can occur either on 
a personal or within a structural level (group 
or country). Identity has a wide range of 
defi nitions including the cultural, social and 
political values att ached to a person or a group. 
It is functions to create a collective and common 
experience of cultural values shared among a 
diverse range of people. Therefore, identity 
confl ict is concerned with group judgments 
toward other groups and their motives (Ross, 
2002). It is also related to the views, ideas or 
ideologies held by a person or group (Ross, 
2007). 
The evolution of the Rohingya confl ict in 
Myanmar has bent towards the scope of identity 
confl ict. Originally rooted in the problem of 
political and economic disparities, it turned 
into a violent identity confl ict. The condition 
was aggravated by the closed social structure 
in Myanmar, which intensifi es perception of 
threat among ethnic and religious groups. 
The tension between groups in Myanmar is 
capable of producing intergroup confl icts. But 
the closed system and scarce economic resource 
alone are insuffi  cient to ignite such confl ict. 
Seul (1999) argues that identity competition 
is a necessary condition to the eruption of 
intergroup confl ict (p. 563). Therefore, identity 
plays a vital role in triggering social confl ict. 
Seul adds that religion has a more powerful 
ability than another symbol of identity, to shift 
the dynamics of group relations. It can produce 
either constructive stability or rapid escalation 
of intergroup confl ict. 
Conflicts of ethnic groups are caused 
by either material or social dynamics factors. 
The perception of threat fuels confl ict between 
ethnic and other identity groups (Kyaw et al., 
2005). The absence of effective government 
typically becomes the main force to trigger 
identity confl icts. Suel (1999) also states that 
despite the powerful capability to escalate the 
confl ict, religion is not the cause of confl ict. 
Rather, it provides the most secure basis 
for maintenance of an identity bound and 
frequently supplies the fault line along which 
intergroup identity and resource competition 
occur. Nonetheless, it is diffi  cult to maintain a 
stable inter-religious group relations without 
an eff ective system and social cohesion. The 
Arakan state, for example, is dealing with 
social cleavage that has lasted for decades, 
sett ing up the Buddhist majority and Muslim 
minorities in a hostile relation. Since the inter-
group relations are constructed on the basis 
of religion, it leads the confl ict to the spiral 
dynamics of ethnic-religious confl icts.
To understand religious confl ict, Basedau 
et al. (2011) defines the conflict into two 
formations. First, the substantial formation in 
which the religious traits become the center 
of discrepancies. Second, the functional 
formation in which religious traits become 
an instrument for group identification (p. 
26). The functional confl ict may also evolve 
into the formation of religious polarization, 
discrimination, and sentiments. Furthermore, 
Fox (as cited in Lindberg, 2008), using t-test 
statistics in analyzing religious conflicts, 
concludes that confl icts between religions tends 
to result in more deaths and higher intensity 
compared to conflicts without religious 
affi  liation. Linberg’s analysis is in line with the 
research on the sett lement of religious confl ict 
completed by Svensson (as cited in Gelfand, 
2004), which draws an alarming conclusion 
that it is unlikely for religious confl ict to be 
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resolved by negotiations. Emotion and loyalty 
are factors that greatly affect the dynamics 
of religious confl ict. Within this context, it is 
crucial to understand the dynamics between 
the Buddhists and the Muslims of Rakhine to 
understand the Rohingya crisis. 
The presence of emotional feeling on 
identity confl ict tends to escalate the tension and 
then shape misperceptions among groups. As 
a result of the emotional manifestation, hatred 
is also embodied in identity confl icts (Ross, 
2007). The range of violent identity confl icts 
spans from discrimination, exploitation, inter-
community tensions, clashes between groups 
of diff erent identities, to its most brutal form: 
the genocide. There are also subtle confl icts 
of identity that exist within the society; 
for example, stereotyping. However, if the 
tension between ethnics is omitt ed, it can lead 
to a danger of misperception. Many identity 
confl icts followed these dynamics: it was never 
a spontaneous confl ict; rather it culminated 
in the history of groups relation. Identity 
conflicts can also stem from “a wounded 
collective pride” (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). 
The “pride” refers to the sense of ownership of 
certain status of the in-group (us) which was 
contradicted by the outsider group (them). 
The sense of pride also drives individuals to 
engage emotionally. In other words, collective 
pride holds signifi cant values to the identity 
construction. For example, the repression over 
the Rohingya in Myanmar provoked a strong 
reaction from Muslims around the world. 
This illustrates how the diff usion of emotional 
feeling toward Muslims in Rohingya has been 
shared beyond the borders of nationality. 
The Muslim community has taken 
various actions in response to the Rohingyas 
crisis—from transnational networks to small 
communities in society, solidarity towards the 
Rohingya had been expressed by protesting 
Myanmar policy to humanitarian action. 
However, in Indonesia, the protests turned into 
a strange direction. In the midst of solidarity 
towards Rohingya, there had been few elements 
of Muslim communities who spread out the 
issue of religious sentiments. There were 
Muslim communities insisting their view 
over the Rohingya crisis and emphasizing the 
repression of Muslims by the Buddhist majority 
of Rakhine. In result, Buddhists in Indonesia are 
subjected to religious sentiments. The sentiment 
is the result of communities att achment. Seul 
(1999) explains that religious communities 
share meaning systems (belonging) and 
affi  rmation (as a basis for self-esteem) (p. 599). 
In the globalized era, the meaning system and 
affirmation are no longer bound to nation 
or border. It means that membership can be 
shared throughout the world, and any member 
can support the development of the other’s 
‘public self,’ to affi  rm the membership of the 
‘private self.’ However, emphasizing confl ict on 
the need of communal (religious) affi  rmation 
has an opposite eff ect to confl ict resolution. It 
will make the existing confl ict prone to escalate 
and provoke anger on the communities who 
hold the same identity. Added to the confl ict 
dynamics, the religious sentiment raises a 
challenge to the principle of impartiality and 
stirs up the paradoxical question of identity. 
Identity can drive a worldwide solidarity, but 
it can also put a dividing wall between in-group 
and out-group. This two sides of the same coin 
occurred in Indonesia with the dividing views 
of the Muslim community over the Rohingya 
humanitarian crisis. The sentiment not only 
tarnished the humanitarian action but posed a 
threat to Indonesian multiculturalism.
Methods
This study uses a qualitative approach to 
explain the identity aspect in the case of religious 
sentiment toward the Buddhist community in 
Indonesia during the Rohingya’s refugees 
crisis that peaked between 2015 and 2017. The 
design of qualitative method arises due to the 
necessity that develops during the process of 
conducting the research (Creswell & Clark, 
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2007). The concepts of identity and solidarity 
(Luhtanen, 1992; Kastoriano, 2000) will be used 
as a theoretical frame in understanding how 
shared identity can construct solidarity toward 
other groups. The method follows a qualitative 
procedure on choosing key informants based 
on consideration of their resourceful insight to 
the topic and their direct involvement in raising 
solidarity toward the Rohingya refugees. Data 
from informants are compared and analysed, 
and we find that there are two contending 
practices of solidarity: fi rst, through the conduct 
of humanitarian act by raising funds to assist 
the refugees; second, by voicing hatred and the 
sentiment toward the Buddhist community in 
Indonesia as a means to show their sympathy 
for the Rohingya. The later practice describes 
the values of radical Muslims in dealing with 
refugees’ problems. Lastly, this article also 
elaborates how the Indonesian government 
deals with the uproar of the religious sentiment 
that threatens multiculturalism. 
This study follows three procedures 
or three stages of research: The first is 
conceptualization research. This stage is crucial 
to set the direction of the research by studying 
pre-preliminary data and theories related to 
the defi nition of identity and identity confl ict. 
The second stage is data collection. In this 
stage, we conducted face to face interviews 
with the primary source and involved directly 
raising funds and assisting the Rohingya when 
they arrived in Indonesia. We interviewed 
representatives from four Muslim communities 
(Dompet Dhuafa, Al-Imdad, Aksi Cepat Tanggap 
(ACT), and Pos Kemanusiaan Peduli Umat 
(PKPU)) and three organizations in charge of 
dealing with the refugees’ problems (SUAKA, 
UNHCR and IOM). In addition to the interviews, 
we also conducted a focus group discussion 
with government officials (Immigration 
Officials in Aceh), Muslim communities 
(komunitas pengajian) which actively raised 
funds for the Rohingya, and academics (expert 
on transnational studies from Universitas 
Padjadjaran, Dr. Dudy Heryadi and expert 
of  Islamic Studies, Dr. Akim). The discussion 
is conducted to gather information on how 
Muslim Indonesia responded to the crisis. The 
third is data analysis, which is the last stage 
when data is interpreted to reach conclusion.
Results
This study outlines the response of 
Indonesian Muslim communities related to 
the Rohingya crisis. It appears that while 
Muslims in Indonesia were involved directly 
in raising the awareness of solidarity toward 
the Rohingya, there is a side of identity politics 
that overshadow the humanitarian act (Hidayat 
et al., 2017). From an interview conducted by 
a research team with NGOs involved in the 
humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya, a 
positive response are shown in solidarity act, 
including fundraising, volunteering, and direct 
distribution of food, clothes and medicine to 
the victims in Myanmar and to the refugees 
stranded in Aceh. Muslim organizations, 
such as Dompet Dhuafa, Aksi Cepat Tanggap 
(ACT), Al-Imdaad, Pos Kemanusiaan Peduli Umat 
(PKPU), are among the first organizations 
that were involved in directly distributing 
aid to Myanmar. They also built networks 
with other Non-state Organization (NGOs) in 
Southeast Asia to coordinate under the platform 
of Southeast Asia Humanitarian Mission 
(SEAHUM).2 In the focus group discussion, 
Heryadi, an expert on transnationalism 
mentioned that “The massive attention 
illustrates the constructive function of identity 
that drives solidarity amongst Muslims.” This 
is confi rmed by Arif Rahmadi, a representative 
from Dompet Dhuafa. However, he specifi ed 
that the patt ern of solidarity demonstrated by 
Indonesia Muslims is diverse: from pengajian3, 
2 Dompet Dhuafa and PKPU are the inisiator of SEAHUM 
from Indonesia. 
3 A general term used to refer to various religious 
learning and teaching activities (Muhzaki as cited in 
Dirdjosanjoto, 1999, p. 3)
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which collected donations from its members, to 
students and individual volunteers who took 
initiative in the streets to collect fundraising. 
This exemplifi es that humanitarian solidarity in 
Indonesia has formed two levels of interaction: 
in the transnational framework (build by 
NGOs) and in societal level (by individual or 
grassroot initiatives).
Unfortunately, the Rohingya tragedy is 
used by an Islam extremist group in Indonesia—
The Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela 
Islam, FPI)—as agenda to attract followers. 
They scapegoated Buddhists in Indonesia by 
accusing them to take part in the atrocities in 
Myanmar. The religious sentiment showed 
that despite the capacity as a driving force for 
humanitarian solidarity, identity can also pose 
a threat to peace and multiculturalism when it 
is politicised (Erdianto, 2017). In the narrow 
sense, identity can create polarization in society. 
In this context, identity is understood solely in 
the sphere of “collective pride” and does not 
function as an instrument for confl ict resolution. 
As Dr. Akim stated in focus group discussion, 
“The sentiment toward Buddhists during the 
campaign of anti-Myanmar government in 
Indonesia showed that religious solidarity and 
sentiment are two sides to the same coin. It is 
contradicts the humanitarian principle, also 
demeaning the act of solidarity.” A problem 
that presents two (paradoxical) sides of identity 
is outlined the Indonesian Muslim respond 
towards the Rohingya crisis.
In an att empt to eliminate the religious 
sentiments and maintain the impartial principles, 
the Indonesian government coordinated with 
various elements to establish an interfaith 
community network. The Humanitarian 
Alliance of Indonesia-Myanmar (Aliansi 
Kemanusiaan Indonesia untuk Myanmar, AKIM) 
consists of various communities, including 
Mer-C, Indonesia Red Cross (Palang Merah 
Indonesia), various Islamic organizations such 
as Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, 
also the community of Indonesian Buddhist 
(Walubi), as well as Catholic and Christian 
organizations. The alliance has two tasks: 
to provide humanitarian assistance and to 
push an appeal to the Myanmar government 
to take appropriate measures for the confl ict 
resolution. But they also have another role 
on a domestic level: to softening religious 
sentiments that culminated in 2017, maintaining 
impartiality and conducting an inclusive form 
of humanitarian aid.
Discussion
The solidarity of the transnational Muslim 
community becomes a vital part of the process 
of providing humanitarian aid for victims of the 
Rohingya crisis. The ASEAN political situation 
that resulted from abiding the principle of 
non-intervention set as an obstacle for the 
organization to take a direct measure to the 
crisis.4 In this stagnant situation, the Muslim 
communities of Southeast Asia initiated 
a humanitarian committee: the Southeast 
Asia Humanitarian Mission (SEAHUM). 
SEAHUM is established by transnational 
Muslim organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand to tackle human right issues 
in Southeast Asia. It was initially formed 
to respond to the Rohingya crisis. Since its 
inception in 2012, various transnational Muslim 
communities in Southeast Asia have become 
members. Dompet Dhuafa, Rumah Zakat, and 
Aksi Cepat Tanggap (ACT) are representatives 
of the Muslim community of Indonesia, while 
IKRAM, HALUAN and Amal Malaysia represent 
the Muslim community of Malaysia. SEAHUM 
is also supported by the Muslim community of 
Thailand who also gave an immediate response 
to the crisis. SEAHUM  is also supported by 
Muslim organizations from another region, 
Al-Imdaad, a transnational Muslim community-
based in South Africa, Britain, Australia and 
4 As Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore Prime Minister said, 
the crisis was “a concern for all Asean countries, and 
yet Asean is not able to intervene to force an outcome” 
(South China Morning Post, 2018)
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Japan. For Muslim organizations in Indonesia, 
the main function of SEAHUM is to ensure that 
organizations work hand-in-hand (Hidayat et 
al., 2017). 
Indonesia also took immediate response 
in dealing with the Rohingya crisis. The shared 
a belief of Islam, that in the context of Muslim 
community solidarity plays an important role 
in encouraging a bond of “brotherhood” to help 
each other (Ismail, personal communication, 
2017). A similar picture can be seen in the 
support of the Muslim community towards the 
Palestine issue, which evolves from territorial 
and political confl ict into an unresolved religious 
issue. The constructive function of identity is 
depicted in solidarity and in the humanitarian 
act of Indonesian Muslims communities. It is 
increasing rapidly since the fi shermen of Aceh 
rescued more than 2,000 Rohingya survivors 
stranded in severe condition near the Malaka 
Strait. Arif Rahmadi Haryono, representatif 
from Dompet Dhuafa (2017), mentioned that 
diverse circles of Muslim community took up 
the streets to raise donations for the Rohingya 
refugees in Aceh. Along with the grass-
roots and individual volunteer, various non-
governmental organizations also contributed 
in establishing coordination—both with the 
Indonesian government and international 
networks—to assist the victims in Myanmar 
and refugees in Aceh. 
T h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  o f  M u s l i m 
communities was also formed based on 
identity similarity that develops as essential 
ramifications for international Muslim 
solidarity.  Kasner (as cited in Kappen, 1995, 
p. 26) explains that the transnational Islamic 
movement is established as a platform for 
cross-national political action, whether in 
ideas, behavior, or identity levels. However, 
result from focus group discussion conducted 
in Universitas Padjadjaran, Jatinangor (2017) 
shows that there is also another form of Muslim 
identity movement that operates in the fi eld of 
humanitarian action. Indonesia has a number of 
non-state organizations that set a fi ne example 
of the humanitarian movement. Malaysia, 
another Muslim majority in Southeast Asia, 
also supports the growing numbers of Muslim 
humanitarian movement. The existence 
of Muslim humanitarian movement has 
reconstructed the traditional meaning of 
Islamic movement. By promoting broad 
cross-border networks, the transnational 
Muslim community has defi ned a new term 
of transnational Moslem as humanitarian 
function.
Trust and cooperation operate as the 
basic formation of transnational Muslim 
solidarity movement, while identity serves as 
the core value for goal sett ing. The combined 
two concepts link identity to transnational 
communities. Milani and Laniado (2007) stated 
that similarity of identity performs as the main 
force in every transnational social movement 
(p. 19). It does not only function as a political 
basis but relates to universal agenda setting 
of the global problem, such as humanitarian 
crisis. The emphasis of identity in the sett ing 
of universal issues is also reflected in the 
symbolic transnational movements such as 
race, sex, nation, or the minority movement. 
Identity drives individuals to contribute either 
formally or voluntarily. The massive support of 
Indonesian Muslims towards the Rohingya has 
a similar basis. The extensive fundraising action 
for Rohingya followed by the rampant mass 
media coverage expressed the strong impulse of 
the Indonesian Muslim community to respond 
to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The 
Muslim communities also encouraged the 
Indonesian government to take an active role in 
mediating the confl ict. They also supported the 
government to issue a fundamental change in the 
Indonesian government’s regulation of refugees 
through Presidential Decree No. 125/2016 
on the procedures for handling international 
refugees. This policy is an important measure 
for Indonesia as the country has not yet ratifi ed 
the 1951 International Convention on Refugees.
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Figure 1. 
Percentage of Indonesian Muslims supporting FPI and its agenda
 Source: Mietz er and Muhtadi, 2018
However, strong identity ties can be a 
preeminent obstacle in the efforts of conflict 
resolution. This means the confl ict resolution 
between ethnicities is almost impossible when 
the spectrum of sacred identity ties are involved. 
Emotional bias—embedded in identity confl ict—
has also contradicted the principle of humanities 
and become a barrier in the eff ort for dialogues 
between confl icting parties. The wide sympathy 
for the Rohingya expressed by Indonesian 
Muslims provides valid evidence that identity 
plays a major emotional tie in promoting 
solidarity. However, added to the enormous 
humanitarian support, a crucial issue related 
to identity ties that tarnished the humanitarian 
efforts and posed a problem in multicultural 
Indonesia had arisen. 
The problem of religious sentiment 
arose in 2017, when there was a massive 
protest staged by Islamic Defenders Front 
(Front Pembela Islam, FPI) in Borobudur, which 
is known as the largest Buddhist site in the 
world. The protesters perceived that the 
Buddhists in Indonesia were also involved 
in the repression in Rakhine; therefore, they 
intended to destroy Borobudur as a symbolic 
action for their resentment. This perception 
discloses the critical construction of identity 
that tends to polarize contending parties into 
a separate line of “us versus them.” The impact 
was felt deeply when the Buddhist community 
in Indonesia was given a violent threat and 
was exploited as the scapegoat for issues in 
Myanmar. The sentiment over Buddhists has 
become a shocking experienced for Indonesian 
Muslims. Extensive exposure of identity to 
promote solidarity has become a driving force 
for hatred. The consequence is terrifying: it led 
to the blind fanaticism that endangers national 
integrity. The issue of religious sentiment 
in Indonesia illustrated how the paradox of 
identities could bring two diff erent response 
to the Rohingya refugees crisis in Indonesia. 
The FPI, who instigated the sentiment, are 
an Islamist intolerance group famous for 
their sweeping action and founded in 1998. 
It has thus far been predominantly depicted 
as a predatory, opportunistic association of 
thugs, whose interests are more economic than 
religious (Wilson, 2014). 
According to Mietzer and Muhtadi 
(2018), FPI supporters ranged from middle class 
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income, to low educated Muslims. Data from 
the 2016 Lembaga Survey Indonesia (LSI) poll is 
illustrative in this regard. Among Indonesian 
Muslims with a tertiary degree, 18.7% knew 
and supported FPI, while only 8.2% of Muslims 
with an elementary school education (or less) 
did. The LSI (in Mietz er & Muftadi, 2018) also 
provided the Muslims supporting FPI since 
2004, as shown in the fi gure 1.
Data in the figure 1. shows that the 
percentage of support given by Indonesian 
Muslim toward the FPI agenda in 2016 has 
reached the highest point with 22.4%.  This 
number is crucial in explaining the popular 
anti-Buddhist sentiment in 2017.  The FPI’s 
response to the Rohingya crisis has tarnished 
the humanitarian aspect of the solidarity. The 
agenda set a fine example of how religious 
identity can bind a strong emotional feeling 
of sympathy and solidarity, also capable of 
driving hatred and sentiment. In dealing with 
this condition, Muslim organizations such as 
Dompet Dhuafa, Rumah Zakat, ACT, Nahdatul 
Ulama (NU), and also Muhammadiyah voiced a 
clear message of impartiality to various circles 
of society. Through expanded campaigns 
and sharing information, they provided an 
understanding of humanitarian principle and 
eff orts to eliminate the religious sentiment.
ACT, for example, explained that the 
main goal of the humanitarian solidarity had 
been “to helping the victims of humanitarian 
crisis and to bring the victims of confl ict to 
regain their lives, and fulfi lling their basic right 
as human beings in general, regardless of their 
identity.” Mr. Husaini Ismail from ACT Aceh 
(2017) said, “We also pushed the message of 
impartiality by voicing their slogan: saving one 
life means to save the humanity.” Dompet Dhuafa 
also voiced the same message of humanitarian 
by providing information about the real 
condition in Myanmar. Arif Rahmadi Haryono 
from Dompet Dhuafa (2017) mentioned  that in 
its campaign, Dompet Dhuafa explained to the 
public that the repression was not limited only 
to the Rohingyas but to other ethnic groups in 
the state of Arakan; therefore, the humanitarian 
assistance was not confi ned only to Rohingya. 
Volunteers of Dompet Dhuafa involved 
directly in providing assistance to the victims 
in Myanmar stated that violence occurred 
in Rakhine also impacted the lives of society 
as a whole, including the Buddhist Rakhine 
community. In this condition, the need for 
humanitarian assistance is not the privilege of 
the Rohingya but also other victims of confl icts 
in Myanmar. The message of impartiality had 
been pushed on their campaign by supporting 
all victims aff ected, regardless of their identity. 
This was an att empt by Muslim organizations 
to minimize the misconceptions and blind 
fanaticism regarding the Rohingyas. Another 
act of impartiality was also demonstrated by 
various Muslim communities by establishing 
interfaith cooperation and coordination in the 
handling of Rohingya refugees in Indonesia. 
The coordination involved organizations such 
as the Wali Buddhist Indonesia (Walubi) and 
the Indonesian Catholic Church communities.
Yet, the challenge to encourage and 
maintain the principle of impartiality is not 
an easy task. This challenge is highlighted 
during the Focus Group Discussion held in 
Bandung with the representatives from AKIM 
and experts of transnationalism, that the eff orts 
of various Muslim communities to promote 
humanitarian principles conflict with the 
interest of particular groups who were using 
the Rohingya issue to increase their political 
popularity. Consequently, the grassroots level 
of Muslim communities had been most prone 
to the provocation. Limited information on the 
ongoing confl ict in Myanmar also developed 
into a great obstacle for the people to give 
balance information on the confl ict. Facing the 
danger of horizontal confl icts, the Indonesian 
government established the Humanitarian 
Alliance of Indonesia-Myanmar (Aliansi 
Kemanusiaan Indonesia untuk Myanmar, AKIM). 
The multi-identity alliance is intended to 
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strengthen the coordination of humanitarian 
actions based on multi religious organizations. 
AKIM members are diverse—from Palang 
Merah Indonesia (Indonesian Red Cross), Mer-C 
to multiple religious organizations. With AKIM 
as a humanitarian platform, the Indonesian 
government stated that humanitarian solidarity 
is not bound by certain identity. 
The alliance has been pro-actively 
conducting double track diplomacy. By 
providing humanitarian assistance, they also 
pushed an appeal to the Myanmar government 
to take appropriate measures for the confl ict 
resolution. In performing their mission, AKIM 
coordinated with various parties including the 
Indonesian government, international refugee 
organizations (IOM and UNHCR), as well as 
religious leaders in Myanmar. The latter is 
crucial in understanding the dynamics of the 
confl ict. In carrying their humanitarian mission, 
AKIM often confronted the bureaucratic 
problem; therefore, the role of the Indonesian 
government to sustain relations with Myanmar 
is very crucial in supporting the role of AKIM’s 
humanitarian diplomatic mission. The task 
for AKIM in resolving and mediating the 
confl ict in Myanmar still has many challenges. 
However, it created a foothold for more 
inclusive humanitarian approach to soften 
religious sentiments in Indonesia.
Conclusion 
The obstacles faced by ASEAN members 
have encouraged Muslim communities from 
various countries to promote solidarity and 
engage directly in the Myanmar conflict. 
As a Muslim majority country, Indonesia 
responded immediately to the crisis and 
led to a humanitarian movement of various 
segments of society. Identity ties played the 
main force for the Muslims in Indonesia 
to provide humanitarian assistance. The 
humanitarian act can be described in two 
main patt erns. First, strengthening solidarity 
in various forms of tabligh; in this form, 
fundraising was conducted in mosques and in 
Islamic centers. Second, giving the donation 
through humanitarian organizations that are 
trustworthy and have extended networks 
with other Muslim communities in diff erent 
countries. Examples are Dompet Dhuafa, ACT, 
and PKPU. However, solidarity based on 
identity has been always overshadowed by the 
adverse impact of fanaticism and emotional 
bias. The anti-Buddhist sentiment occurred 
in 2017 is a clear example of how fanaticism 
over identity could threaten Indonesian 
multiculturalism.
Nonetheless, identity still plays an 
important force in generating emotional 
attachment. Through the bond of identity, 
the Muslims in Indonesia can continually 
provide humanitarian assistance to the 
Rohingya. However, the blind fanaticism 
of identity could be the main obstacle in 
carrying the principle of impartiality. The 
politicization of the Rohingya issue by the 
FPI that occurred in Indonesia has tarnished 
the solidarity of humanity. Impartiality that 
should be the basis of humanitarian action is 
challenged by identity sentiment. Facing the 
critical condition, the Indonesian government 
with various Muslim communities initiated 
an inclusive network and coordination 
for humanitarian action. The Indonesia-
Myanmar Humanitarian Alliance (AKIM) is 
established to muffl  e the religious sentiment 
by maintaining impartiality in providing 
assistance to the victims in Myanmar. In 
outlining the Indonesian Muslims’ response 
to the Rohingya crisis, we confronted the 
politicization of identity. Identity approach 
to a social confl ict can result a constructive 
manner, but it also can trigger a sentiment 
that threatens Indonesian multiculturalism, 
when it is politicised for the sake of political 
power. This article, however, is limited to the 
explanation of the cause of religious sentiment 
and identity confl ict. How to tackle religious 
sentiment still needs further elaboration.
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